This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the agent's valuations are positively correlated, and (c) preferences in the downstream relationship are separable, then it is optimal for the upstream principal to offer the agent full privacy. On the contrary, when any of these conditions is violated, there exist preferences for which disclosure is strictly optimal, even if the downstream principal does not pay for the information. We also examine the effects of disclosure on welfare and show that it does not necessarily reduce the agent's surplus in the two relationships and in some cases may even yield a Pareto improvement. JEL Classification Numbers: D82, C73, L1.
Introduction
In markets where different principals contract sequentially with the same agent, as when a buyer purchases from multiple sellers, the contracts offered by a downstream principal are often influenced by the decisions taken, as well as the information disclosed, in upstream relationships. 1 A buyer's willingness to pay for a product may depend on its complementarity or substitutability with the products and services of upstream vendors. For example, the value of a new software application depends largely on its compatibility with the user's operating system, hardware, and other software applications. Furthermore, even in the absence of complementarities, the choice of a product, the request for a service, or simply the path followed in visiting a website may reveal valuable information about consumers' preferences and idiosyncratic characteristics. Knowing what products a consumer has purchased upstream thus allows a downstream seller to better tailor her contract offers and price discriminate. Personalized offers based on upstream transactions have indeed become common practice since the advent of online commerce and are present in a variety of markets including software, travel, and pharmaceutical products.
An upstream seller who expects her buyers to contract with a downstream one is thus likely to take advantage of her Stackelberg position by designing contract offers in a way that optimally controls for the influence they have on downstream contracting. There are two ways an upstream contract can affect a downstream one: directly, through the decisions it stipulates (contractual externalities), and indirectly, through the information it discloses (informational externalities).
In this paper we investigate how a principal should optimally control for both types of externalities, designing a menu of contract offers that screens the agent's type and strategically discloses information to a downstream principal.
We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the agent's valuations are positively correlated, and (c) preferences in the downstream relationship are separable so that the level of trade is independent of upstream decisions, then the optimal disclosure policy consists in offering the agent full privacy. This holds regardless of the price the downstream principal is willing to pay.
In fact, under conditions (a)-(c), a downstream seller is interested in getting information on upstream decisions only if this is indirectly informative about the buyer's exogenous type. The only benefits of disclosure then come from an information-trade effect, i.e. the possibility of making a profit by selling information to the downstream seller, and/or a rent-shifting effect, that is, the possibility of inducing the downstream seller to offer the buyer a personalized discount.
Suppose the buyer has either a low or a high valuation for the product of the downstream seller. If the latter believes the buyer's valuation is high (say, because marketing surveys indicate that the percentage of high-valuation buyers is significantly higher than that of low-valuation ones), the optimal price in the downstream relationship leaves no surplus to the buyer. In this case, the upstream seller may attempt to induce the downstream one to offer a discount by disclosing information that is correlated with the buyer's valuation. The rent-shifting effect then consists in making the buyer pay a higher price upstream for the increase in his expected utility downstream.
However, for disclosure to be valuable, the buyer must be given an incentive to reveal his type. When valuations are positively correlated, the extra rent a seller must leave to the buyer when she discloses information more than offsets both the rent-shifting and the information-trade effects, making full privacy optimal.
Conversely, we also prove that when any one of the above conditions is violated, there exist preferences for which disclosure is strictly optimal, even if the upstream principal is not allowed, or able, to sell information.
First, consider direct externalities. When the upstream principal is personally interested in the downstream level of trade, as in the case of a vendor whose compensation depends on the sales (or market share) of another vendor, she may well accept to pay the incentive costs of disclosure (in terms of higher rents to the buyer) if this enables her to affect decisions downstream. With positive externalities, disclosure is optimal when it increases the downstream level of trade; with negative externalities, when it decreases it.
Next, we relax the assumption of positive correlation in the agents' valuations by considering the case of two horizontally differentiated sellers. When the single crossing condition is of opposite sign for upstream and downstream decisions, disclosure does not necessarily increase the rent that the upstream principal must leave to the buyer, it may actually reduce it. By increasing the downstream rent of those types who value the upstream product the least, disclosure creates countervailing incentives that can be used to minimize the informational rents required for information revelation. On the other hand, since disclosure is incentive-compatible only if trade in the upstream relationship is not certain, it is optimal only when the cost of not selling to all types is small as compared with the benefit of increasing the probability of a price discount downstream.
Finally, we consider environments where the agents' preferences are not separable, as in the case of a buyer whose willingness to pay for a product depends on its complementarity, or substitutability, with the products of an upstream seller (the case of contractual externalities). By introducing uncertainty about upstream decisions (for example through lotteries, mixed strategies, or simply by selling only to a subset of types), a seller can create rents for her buyers in the downstream relationship. In this case, the optimal mechanism may also require a policy that discloses information correlated with the upstream level of trade. With complements, disclosure is motivated by the possibility of inducing the downstream seller to ask a lower price to consumers who have purchased upstream, whereas with substitutes, to those who did not.
For each of the environments described above, we also compare the equilibrium contracts when a principal cannot disclose information with the contracts that are offered in equilibrium when disclosure is permitted. Perhaps surprisingly, disclosure does not necessarily harm the agent, it may actually increase his surplus in the two relationships. This is consistent with a claim that is commonly made by vendors in their privacy policies, namely that consumers who agree to share information with the vendor's business partners may benefit from personalized discounts and tailormade offers.
The effects of disclosure on total welfare -the sum of sellers' profits and consumer surplus -remain however ambiguous. On the one hand, by reducing the distortions due to the initial asymmetry of information, disclosure tends to increase efficiency in downstream contracting. On the other hand, disclosure may introduce new distortions in upstream decisions. This may be due to incentive compatibility or to the uncertainty about the level of upstream trade introduced with the intent of leading to an increase in consumer surplus downstream. 2 None of these results is really specific to buyer-seller relationships. We expect the determinants of information disclosure discussed above to play an important role also in: Labor relationships. An employer who hires a worker typically receives letters of recommendation from previous employers describing the worker's characteristics (talent, fairness, relations with colleagues), but also the tasks performed in upstream relationships. Insurance. Clients who purchase multiple policies are notified that relevant personal information (e.g. the number of accidents in the past few years and the type of risk borne by policy-holders) will be shared with partners. Financial relationships. Venture capitalists often disclose information about a project's profitability, as well as personal characteristics of entrepreneurs, to other investors in order to convince them to join. Entrants in the credit card market get detailed information on potential customers from credit bureaus and other lenders. Regulation and taxation of multinational firms. Foreign regulators usually operate on the basis of the information provided by domestic agencies. Information-sharing between domestic and foreign tax authorities is often considered to be largely strategic and is at the heart of political debates.
In what follows, first we briefly relate the paper to the pertinent literature. Section 2 then describes the sequential contracting game and illustrates how optimal policies can be obtained through a mechanism design approach. Section 3 derives the conditions for the optimality of full privacy. Sections 4 and 5 examine the determinants of the disclosure of exogenous and endogenous information. Section 6 concludes. Technical proofs are given in the Appendix.
Related literature
This paper is related to several lines of research in contract theory, mechanism design, and industrial organization with asymmetric information.
Strategic information-sharing between firms has been examined in the literature on oligopolistic competition (see Raith, 1998 , for a survey), and in the financial intermediation literature (Padilla and Pagano, 1998, and Jappelli, 1993) . In these papers, before competing, firms decide whether to share information with rivals. In our model, by contrast, upstream principals are initially uninformed; in fact, they learn by contracting with the agent and create new private information by taking decisions that affect downstream principals. Sellers' disclosure policies have 2 For disclosure to have positive effects on welfare and consumer surplus, it is important that buyers be able to trust that firms will keep their promises about their privacy policies, as we assume in this paper. One way vendors can increase consumers' confidence is by signing contracts with certification intermediaries such as Better Business Bureau, TRUSTe and WebTrust. By displaying the seal of these intermediaries, a vendor agrees to inform consumers of what personally identifiable information is collected, which organization collects it, how it is used, with whom it may be shared, and what choices are available to consumers regarding its collection, use and distribution. For a detailed discussion of the importance of trust in e-commerce, see the Federal Trade Commission report "Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace" 2000. also been analyzed by Lizzeri (1999) in a model where certification intermediaries have a technology to test the quality of the seller's product and commit on what to disclose to competitive buyers. Here, instead, we assume that the only way a principal can learn the agent's private information is through a screening mechanism.
A recent literature on consumers' privacy considers environments where sellers can use information on individual purchasing history to engage in product customization and price discrimination (Acquisti and Varian, 2002; Dodds, 2002; and Taylor, 2003a,b) . In this literature, however, the choice of the disclosure policy is not endogenous.
Informational linkages between markets have been studied in the literature on auctions followed by resale. Haile (1999) examines the effects on revenue of bidders' incentives to signal information to the secondary market. Calzolari and Pavan (2004) and Zheng (2002) study optimal auctions and derive revenue-maximizing selling procedures and disclosure policies.
Sequential common agency models have also been examined in Baron (1985) , Bergman and Välimäki (2004), Martimort (1999) , and Prat and Rustichini (1998) . In this literature, principals offer their contracts sequentially, but decisions are taken only after the agents have received all proposals. On the contrary, we assume that the agent first contracts with an upstream principal, reveals his exogenous type, takes a payoff-relevant decision, and then enters into a new bilateral relationship with a second principal. This timing is more appropriate for examining the design of optimal disclosure policies. Segal (1999) , and Segal and Whinston (2003) provide a general and unifying framework for contracting with externalities. Martimort and Stole (2003) consider direct externalities between principals in a simultaneous common agency game. Daughety and Reinganum (2002) examine the role of informational externalities and confidentiality in a model where two plaintiffs sequentially file suit against the same defendant. Unlike these works, the current paper combines direct externalities with informational ones and shows how they are fashioned by an upstream principal through the design of an optimal disclosure policy.
The contracting environment

The model set up
Players. Since none of the results is truly specific to buyer-seller relationships, we find it convenient to describe the contracting environment as a common agency game where two principals, P 1 and P 2 , contract sequentially with the same agent, A. 3 Allocations and preferences. Each principal must select a decision x i ∈ X i and a transfer t i ∈ T i = R from A to P i . The vector x ≡ (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X ≡X 1 × X 2 denotes a profile of decisions for the two principals. The agent's preferences are represented by the function U A = v A (x, θ) − t 1 − t 2 , and the two principals' preferences by U i = v i (x, θ) + t i , for i = 1, 2. The variable θ ∈ Θ denotes the agent's exogenous private information. We assume that X i and Θ are finite sets with X i = {0, 1} and Θ ≡ © θ, θ ª . x i = 1 denotes the decision to trade and x i = 0 the "status quo," that is, x i = 0 in the absence of a contract between A and P i , with v i (0, 0, θ) = 0 for any θ ∈ Θ and i ∈ {1, 2, A}. The two principals are assumed to share a common prior Pr(θ) = p = 1 − Pr(θ).
That Θ and X i are finite sets simplifies the description of the stochastic mechanisms. As is shown in the Appendix, Theorem 1 extends to environments where θ is continuously distributed over [θ, θ] as well as to X 1 = X 2 = R + .
Contracts and privacy policies. Each principal offers the agent a mechanism (hereafter also referred to as a menu of contract offers). A mechanism φ 2 ∈ Φ 2 for P 2 consists of a message space M 2 along with a mapping φ 2 : M 2 7 → X 2 × T 2 , where x 2 (m 2 ) ∈ X 2 and t 2 (m 2 ) ∈ T 2 denote respectively the decision and the transfer associated with message m 2 . 4 For her part, P 1 offers a mechanism φ 1 ∈ Φ 1 that is characterized by a message space M 1 , a set of signals S that P 1 will disclose to P 2 , and a mapping φ 1 :
stand for the joint lottery over X 1 ×S and the expected transfer associated with message m 1 ∈ M 1 . With the standard abuse of notation in mechanism design, δ 1 (x 1 , s|m 1 ) will denote the conditional probability of x 1 and s, given m 1 , and δ 1 (x 1 |m 1 ) = P s∈S δ 1 (x 1 , s|m 1 ) the associated probability of trade. The mechanism φ 1 embeds a disclosure policy d : M 1 → 4(S): When the agent chooses message m 1 , P 1 sends a signal s to P 2 with probability d(s|m 1 ) = P
. We assume S is sufficiently rich to generate the desired posterior beliefs for P 2 : as we show below, since Θ and X 1 are finite, it will suffice to treat S also as a finite set. Note that the mechanism φ 1 is (possibly) stochastic for two reasons: First, P 1 may want to create uncertainty about x 1 in order to influence the contracts offered by P 2 ; second, it may be in the interest of P 1 not to reveal to P 2 all the information disclosed in the upstream relationship. In other words, P 1 may find it optimal to disclose to P 2 only a noisy signal of (θ, x 1 ). 5 P 1 is not exogenously compelled to release any particular information, so she can select the disclosure policy she wants.
We assume each principal can commit perfectly to her mechanism, which also implies that P 1 can commit credibly to the disclosure policy of her choosing. 6 With this assumption we rule out two possible scenarios. In the first, P 1 discloses more information than allowed by φ 1 . In the second, P 1 publicly announces a disclosure policy d but then secretly offers the agent a side contract with a different policy.
As is standard in common agency games, we also assume that neither principal can contract over the decisions of the other.
Finally, we denote by τ (φ 1 ) the price P 2 pays to observe the signals disclosed by φ 1 . We want τ (φ 1 ) to be the price for information and not for the distribution over X 1 . To this end, we assume τ (φ 1 ) is contracted after φ 1 has been executed, so that P 1 cannot threaten P 2 with changing her decision if she fails to pay τ . Instead of modelling a bargaining game between P 1 and P 2 explicitly, we consider a set of rational prices that can be the result of various bargaining procedures. Let U 2 (φ 1 ) be the expected payoff for P 2 in the continuation game where she observes the signals disclosed by φ 1 and U ND 2 (φ 1 ) in the continuation game in which she receives no information. Given φ 1 , we define the set of rational prices as
The parameter γ captures the fraction of the value that P 2 attaches to the information disclosed by φ 1 that P 1 can appropriate through the price τ (φ 1 ). Clearly, τ (φ 1 ) = 0 for any γ if φ 1 does not reveal any valuable information.
Timing: a sequential contracting game -At t = 0, A privately learns θ.
-At t = 1, P 1 announces a public mechanism φ 1 ∈ Φ 1 . If A rejects φ 1 , the game ends and all players are left with their reservation payoffs, which are set to zero. If A accepts φ 1 , he chooses a message m 1 and pays an expected transfer t 1 (m 1 ); a decision x 1 ∈ X 1 and a signal s ∈ S are then selected with probability δ 1 (x 1 , s|m 1 ). The realization of the lottery δ 1 (m 1 ) is observed jointly by A and P 1 .
-At t = 2, P 2 pays τ (φ 1 ), receives information from P 1 and offers a mechanism φ 2 ∈ Φ 2 . If A rejects φ 2 , the game is over. Otherwise, A reports a message m 2 , which induces a decision x 2 (m 2 ) and a transfer t 2 (m 2 ).
Assuming that φ 1 is public is equivalent to assuming that P 2 can observe the mapping φ 1 :
That the game ends after A rejects φ 1 is clearly not without loss of generality. However, note that in the game where A can contract with P 2 after rejecting φ 1 , there exist equilibria where P 1 informs P 2 about the rejection such that all types obtain zero surplus with P 2 out-of-equilibrium. These equilibria also satisfy forward induction refinements such as the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) and lead to the highest payoff for P 1 . Rather than rely on refinements to determine A's outside option in the upstream relationship, we prefer, given the focus of the analysis, to assume it is exogenously fixed to zero.
Contract design
The game described above is a sequential version of the simultaneous common agency games with adverse selection examined in Martimort (1992) , Stole (2002, 2003) , and Stole (1991) . A strategy for P 1 is simply the choice of a mechanism φ 1 ∈ Φ 1 . For P 2 , a strategy is a mapping from Φ 1 and S onto the set of mechanisms Φ 2 . 7 The agent's strategy specifies the reports to each principal as a function of the agent's information set, i.e.
A strategy profile is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if and only if: each principal selects a mechanism that is sequentially optimal given the strategies of the agent and the other principal; for each signal s on the equilibrium path, P 2 updates beliefs using Bayes' rule; and A sends only payoff-maximizing messages.
It is well known that in games where agents contract with multiple mechanism designers, the standard version of the revelation principle is not valid and the characterization of the entire set of common agency equilibria is problematic [Epstein and Peters (1999) , Martimort and Stole (2002) , Peters (2001) , Pavan and Calzolari (2004) ]. In this paper, however, we are interested only in the properties of the equilibrium contracts that lead to the highest payoff for the upstream principal. 8 It then suffices to search for mechanisms φ where (IR 2 ) and (IC 2 ) are the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. Note that we are implicitly assuming there is no way A can credibly disclose (x 1 , t 1 ) to P 2 , so that the latter has to provide incentives for truthful revelation.
Consider now the problem faced by P 1 . At t = 1, P 1 designs a mechanism φ 1 -with reaction {φ 2 (s)} s∈S -that solves
In addition to standard individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints, the (SR) constraint in P 1 guarantees the optimality of P 2 's reaction. Treating {φ 2 (s)} s∈S as a choice variable in P 1 amounts to selecting the equilibrium which is most favorable to P 1 . Before analyzing the optimal contracts, we find it useful to formally define disclosure as well as contracts that optimally induce it.
Definition 1
The mechanism φ 1 discloses information if and only if it assigns positive measure to signals that lead to different posterior beliefs over Θ E 2 : Formally, there exist signals s l ∈ S (d; φ 1 ) and s m ∈ S (d; φ 1 ) , with s l 6 = s m , such that µ(θ
Information disclosure is optimal for P 1 if and only if there exists a mechanism φ 1 that discloses information and solves P 1 , and there are no other solutions to P 1 that do not disclose information.
On the optimality of privacy
In this section, we identify and discuss preferences that make full privacy the optimal policy for P 1 . To save on notation, let
The sign of the single crossing condition in player i's preferences is the same for upstream and downstream decisions if, for any
Theorem 1 Assume the following: (a) P 1 's preferences are independent of x 2 ; (b) the sign of the single crossing condition in the agent's preferences is the same for upstream and downstream decisions; (c) the preferences of P 2 and A are additively separable. Then no disclosure is optimal for P 1 , no matter what price P 2 is willing to pay to receive information.
The formal proof is in the Appendix. Here, let us simply sketch the intuition. Without loss, assume the sign of the single crossing condition is positive. When the agent's preferences are separable, this is equivalent to assuming that the valuations v 1 A (1, θ) and v 2 A (1, θ) are both increasing in θ. When P 2 's preferences are also separable, the optimal mechanism for P 2 does not depend on x 1 . It follows that under (a)-(c), the only benefit of influencing downstream decisions by disclosing information correlated with θ comes from a rent-shifting and/or an information-trade effect. The first consists in designing a policy that induces P 2 to leave the agent a rent and then set a higher price upstream. The second is the possibility of making money directly by selling information to the downstream principal.
Let φ
A (θ)) denote the mechanism that P 2 offers if she receives no information from P 1 . Under separability, this mechanism is not a function of φ 1 , for the downstream surplus
is independent of upstream decisions. Now, suppose φ 1 -with reaction φ 2 -is optimal and discloses information. In this case, there exists another individually rational and incentive-compatible mechanism φ -that does not release any information, that induces the same distribution over X 1 , and is such that 12
12 To compact notation, we omit the dependence of U 1 on φ 2 .
When γ = 0, τ(φ 1 ) = 0 for any φ 1 , the information-trade effect is absent, and hence the only benefit of disclosure comes from the rent-shifting effect, which corresponds to the first term in (1).
Conversely, when γ = 1, the rent-shifting effect is absent since any money that P 1 can extract from A for the increase in the informational rent she expects from P 2 must be deducted from the price τ (φ 1 ). When this is the case, the only benefit of disclosure derives from the possibility of increasing efficiency in the downstream relationship, as indicated in the second term in (1) .
Both the rent-shifting and the information-trade effects may well be positive. Disclosure, however, also affects the incentives for the agent to misrepresent his type to P 1 and hence the rent the latter must give A for truthful information, as indicated in the last term in (1) . Under (b) and (c) this effect more than offsets the first two. It follows that in the absence of direct externalities (that is, when (a) also holds), the optimal policy for P 1 is to offer the agent full privacy.
To see this, note that φ 2 leaves no rent to θ and a rent U 2
toθ which is increasing in the posterior odds µ(θ; s)/µ(θ; s) and hence in d(s|θ)/d(s|θ). Furthermore, in any upstream mechanism that is optimal for
. Among all mechanisms that induce the same distribution over X 1 as φ 1 without disclosing information, consider a mechanism φ
It is easy to see that if φ 1 is individually rational and incentivecompatible, so is φ
Assume for a moment γ = 0 so that there is no information-trade effect. Then substituting (2) into (1) gives
Indeed, suppose P 1 discloses only two signals, s 1 and s 2 , and let d(
This result clearly extends to more general disclosure policies. The most favorable signals are always disclosed with a higher probability when A announces a low type. It follows that the additional surplus A obtains with P 2 when P 1 discloses information is more than offset by the increase in the rent P 1 must sacrifice to A to induce him to reveal information, making disclosure unprofitable for P 1 .
Next consider the information-trade effect and assume γ = 1, in which case disclosure is motivated entirely by the possibility of increasing efficiency in the downstream relationship. Again substituting (2) into (1) and using the fact that the downstream decisions x 2 (θ; s) do not depend on s gives
which is never positive since
The explanation is simple. When γ = 1, the price τ (φ 1 ) = U 2 (φ 1 )−U 2 (φ ND 1 ) allows P 1 to fully internalize the effect of disclosure on U 2 . If P 1 could directly control x 2 (θ), she would then optimally trade off efficiency and rent extraction by maximizing
A (x 2 , θ). But since this is exactly the same decision P 2 takes when her posterior beliefs are equal to the prior, the best P 1 can do is to commit not to disclose any information.
Finally, note that if disclosure is not profitable when γ = 1, it is clearly not profitable when γ < 1. We thus conclude that under (a)-(c), the optimal policy is always full privacy, irrespective of the price P 2 is willing to pay for information.
Theorem 1 does not depend on the discreteness of Θ, X 1 and X 2 . As we show in the Appendix, the theorem extends to environments where θ is continuously distributed over [θ, θ] and X i = R + for i = 1, 2, under the usual additional assumptions for the continuous case, which guarantee that in the canonical single mechanism designer problem, the optimal policies x i (θ) are deterministic with no bunching.
It is interesting to compare the result in Theorem 1 with Baron and Besanko (1984) . They consider a dynamic single-principal single-agent relationship and show that when type is constant over time, the optimal long-term contract under full commitment consists in a sequence of static optimal contracts. Although the two results appear similar, they are actually quite different. In Baron and Besanko, there is a single principal who maximizes the intertemporal payoff v 1 (x 1 , θ) + v 2 (x 2 , θ) + t(θ), whereas in our setting the upstream principal maximizes only v 1 (x 1 , θ) + t(θ) + τ , where τ = 0 in the absence of disclosure. This implies that P 1 may well be happy to reduce the joint payoff for the two principals, if by so doing she can appropriate a larger part of the total surplus, as is illustrated in the next section. Also, even if P 1 were to maximize the principals' joint payoff, she would not necessarily offer the static optimal contracts. This would be the case if the preferences of the downstream principal were not only separable but also independent of x 1 , as in Baron and Besanko. When instead they are only separable, the static optimal contracts -which coincide with the contracts that are offered in equilibrium when P 1 does not disclose informationfail to internalize the externality of x 1 on P 2 .
The next result provides a converse to Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 When any one of the conditions in Theorem 1 is violated, there exist preferences for which disclosure is strictly optimal for P 1 , even if P 2 does not pay for information.
In this sense, the conditions of Theorem 1 are not only sufficient but "almost necessary" to make privacy in sequential contracting optimal. The proof follows from the results of the next two sections, where we examine the determinants of the disclosure of exogenous and endogenous information separately. To prove that disclosure can be optimal whatever rational price P 2 is willing to pay, we consider the least favorable scenario where τ (φ 1 ) = 0 for any φ 1 , in which case disclosure is free of charge.
Disclosure of exogenous information
To separate the effects associated with the disclosure of exogenous information (about θ) from those associated with the disclosure of endogenous information (about x 1 ), in this section, we again consider an environment where preferences in the downstream relationship are separable so that P 2 is interested in receiving information about x 1 only if this is indirectly informative about θ. In particular, assume the following holds.
Condition 1 The agent's preferences are separable: v
Assuming that the preferences of the downstream principal are not only separable but independent of θ and x 1 shortens the exposition without any significant effect on the results. 13 In a buyer-seller relationship, m 2 ≤ 0 can be interpreted as the marginal cost to the downstream seller. To make the analysis interesting, we then assume m 2 + b (θ) > 0 for any θ, which guarantees that, under complete information, it is always efficient to trade downstream. We also assume that ∆b ≡ b(θ) − b(θ) > 0. Under these conditions, the solution to P 2 (s) assigns the same allocation to θ E 2 = (θ, 1) and θ E 2 = (θ, 0) and is equivalent to a take-it-or-leave-it offer at a price
As a consequence, P 1 needs to disclose only two signals, s 1 and s 2 , such that t 2 (s 1 ) = b and t 2 (s 2 ) = b. 14 This also implies that the optimal disclosure policy must satisfy
where H ≡ (
∆b ). Given s 1, trade in the downstream relationship occurs only if θ = θ and the agent gets zero surplus; while, given s 2 , trade occurs with both types and θ enjoys a downstream rent equal to ∆b.
, P 2 asks a high price in the event she receives no information from P 1 . We call prior beliefs that satisfy this condition unfavorable to the agent. On the contrary, P 2 's beliefs are favorable when H ≥ 1. Also note that when H < 1, (SR 1 ) is implied by (SR 2 ) and no disclosure is formally equivalent to sending signal s 1 , whereas the opposite is true with favorable beliefs in which case no disclosure corresponds to sending only signal s 2 .
Direct externalities
Suppose now that P 1 's payoff depends directly on x 2 , as in the case of a seller whose compensation is based on his relative performance compared to another vendor. An alternative example examined 13 Adding an externality q2 (θ) x1 to P2's preferences does not affect the downstream decisions. Also, letting m2 depend on θ does not add much to the analysis since the virtual surplus for the P 2 − A relationship already depends on θ through its effect on A's payoff.
14 For any mechanism φ 1 that discloses more than two signals, there exists another mechanism φ 0 that discloses at most two signals which is payoff-equivalent for all players.
in the literature (Martimort and Stole, 2004 ) is one where P 1 and P 2 are two retailers purchasing from a common manufacturer. When the products of the two retailers are strategic substitutes, P 1 may find it optimal to disclose information about the manufacturer to influence the downstream retailer's decision to purchase additional units. To capture the possibility of direct externalities, assume the following holds.
The term m 1 can be read as the marginal cost to P 1 . We require that m 1 + a(θ) > 0 for any θ so that it is always efficient to trade in the upstream relationship. We also assume that ∆a ≡ a(θ) − a(θ) > 0 : The sign of the single crossing condition is thus the same for x 1 and x 2 , implying that disclosure is costly for P 1 .
Depending on the environment, the externality e can be either positive or negative. It is probably negative in the examples above. However, it could be positive in the case of a telephone company that is considering switching to optical fiber and sharing the network of a downstream Internet or cable TV provider.
Under Conditions (1) and (2), the surplus that A expects from the two relationships given φ 1 is
The optimal mechanism thus maximizes (4) subject to (SR 1 ), (SR 2 ) and
Because trade in the downstream relationship occurs with certainty when θ = θ and with probability d(s 2 |θ) when θ = θ, the expected externality of x 2 on P 1 is pe
Since preferences in the downstream relationship are separable and there are no marginal effects of
A (x 1 , θ), the joint lottery δ 1 (x 1 , s|θ) can be decomposed into a disclosure policy d(s|θ) and a trade policy δ 1 (1|θ), where d(s|θ) and δ 1 (1|θ) can be treated as independent distributions. This also implies that δ 1 (1|θ) can either be read as the probability of trade or as the quantity traded, with δ 1 (1|θ) ∈ [0, 1] . 15 Finally, note that constraint (IC 1 ) is an "adjusted" monotonicity condition which reduces to the standard monotonicity condition δ 1 (1|θ) ≥ δ 1 (1|θ) when no information is disclosed. On the contrary, when P 1 discloses information, monotonicity becomes strict for it requires δ 1 (1|θ) < δ 1 (1|θ). Indeed, suppose P 1 sells with certainty to both types. Then the low type, who does not expect any surplus in the downstream relationship, would always choose the contract with the lowest price. However, since disclosure requires that P 1 sends the most favorable signal s 2 with higher probability when A reports θ than θ, the high type would also find it optimal to choose the low-type contract, making P 1 's mechanism not incentive-compatible.
It (1) and (2) . When P 2 's beliefs are unfavorable to the agent, disclosure is optimal if and only if there are large positive externalities. When they are favorable, disclosure is optimal for large negative externalities.
Note that in either case, P 1 never fully informs P 2 about θ. Indeed, full disclosure is costly (in terms of rent for θ and inefficient trade with θ) and is either unnecessary to induce the desired level of trade or else incentive-incompatible.
We now turn to the effects of disclosure on individual payoffs. We compare the optimal contracts with disclosure (formally derived in the proof of Proposition 1) with those that would be offered if P 1 were not able, or allowed, to disclose information. Because preferences are separable in the downstream relationship, these contracts simply consist in a take-it-or-leave-it offer at price t 1 = a if m 1 + a − p 1−p ∆a ≥ 0 and at price t 1 = a otherwise.
Corollary 1 When P 2 's beliefs are unfavorable, disclosure leads to a Pareto-improvement: P 1 and A are strictly better off, whereas P 2 is indifferent. When P 2 's beliefs are favorable, disclosure makes A worse off, P 1 better off, and leaves P 2 indifferent. The effect of disclosure on total welfare is positive for large negative externalities and negative otherwise. P 2 is not affected by disclosure since the optimal mechanism φ * 1 makes her indifferent between asking the prices she would have asked in the absence of disclosure and the equilibrium ones. Together with the fact that P 2 's preferences are independent of x 1 so that she is not personally affected by changes in upstream decisions, this implies that P 2 is just as well off as in the absence of disclosure.
Next, consider the effect of disclosure on the agent's payoff and recall that under the optimal contracts, U A (θ; φ * 1 ) = 0 and U A (θ;
∆b ∆a , implying that A strictly benefits from disclosure. Indeed, even if disclosure comes at the expenses of a reduction of δ 1 (1|θ), this is more than compensated by the increase in the downstream rent. The reason is that disclosure increases the surplus that θ obtains by mimicking θ, but also the surplus that θ obtains by truthfully reporting his type. In turn this allows P 1 to increase the rent she cedes to the high type without inducing the low type to mimic.
With favorable beliefs, things are different. In this case, P 1 induces P 2 to ask a higher price. Furthermore, when m 1 + a − p 1−p ∆a ≥ 0, P 1 reduces the level of trade with the low type to satisfy (IC 1 ). As a consequence, A always suffers from disclosure. The effect on total welfare then depends on how strong the externality is. For moderate values, the negative effect on A prevails and welfare decreases with disclosure; for large negative externalities, the opposite is true.
Horizontal differentiation and countervailing incentives
We now turn to environments where the agent's valuations for x 1 and x 2 are negatively correlated, as when a buyer has horizontally differentiated preferences for the products of two sellers. Alternatively, A could be a retailer, or a marketing agent, with superior information than manufacturers about consumers' location in the space of characteristics differentiating the two brands.
Disclosure is now motivated by the rent-shifting effect, i.e. the possibility of appropriating the surplus A obtains in the downstream relationship. As was shown in the previous section, this is never possible when A's valuations are positively correlated, for in that case any increase in the agent's downstream surplus is more than offset by the increase in the rent that P 1 must cede to induce truthful revelation. But when the two products are horizontally differentiated, those types who can potentially benefit from the rent in the downstream relationship are those who attach less value to the product provided by the upstream principal. As a consequence, disclosure may create countervailing incentives that help P 1 extract more surplus from the agent. On the other hand, disclosure may come at the cost of an inefficient level of trade upstream, required by incentive compatibility.
To illustrate, assume preferences in the downstream relationship are described by Condition 1, and suppose the following also holds. 16 Condition 3 P 1 's preferences are independent of θ and x 2 : v 1 (x 1 , x 2 , θ) = m 1 x 1 ; the single crossing condition in the agent's preferences has opposite signs for x 1 and x 2 : ∆a < 0 < ∆b.
To make things interesting, we continue to assume that m 1 + a(θ) > 0 for any θ so that it is always efficient to trade in the upstream relationship. P 1 's optimal mechanism maximizes
Note that θ continues to get ∆b more than θ when P 2 asks a low price, but now gets |∆a| less than θ from trading with P 1 . As a consequence, it is not possible to determine which constraint binds a priori since this depends on which countervailing incentive prevails. Nevertheless, in any optimal mechanism, at least one (IR 1 ) and one (IC 1 ) constraint necessarily bind, and trade with the low type occurs with certainty, i.e. δ * 1 (1|θ) = 1. As for the optimal disclosure policy, when P 2 's prior beliefs are favorable, no disclosure is always optimal, since having P 2 ask a low price increases the price θ is willing to pay for the upstream product and reduces the rent for θ.
Consider next the case of unfavorable beliefs. In the absence of disclosure, the optimal mechanism consists in trading with either type at a price t 1 = a if m 1 + a − 1−p p |∆a| ≥ 0 and only with the low type at a price t 1 = a otherwise. When m 1 + a − 1−p p |∆a| < 0, disclosure is always optimal. Indeed, by adopting a disclosure policy such that d * (s 2 |θ) = min{1, |∆a| ∆b } and d * (s 2 |θ) = Hd(s 2 |θ), P 1 can fully appropriate the surplus d * (s 2 |θ)∆b that θ expects from downstream contracting without increasing the rent for θ. What is more, disclosure allows P 1 to sell also to θ with positive probability, once again without leaving any rent to the low type.
When m 1 + a − 1−p p |∆a| ≥ 0, things are more complicated because disclosure may require a reduction in the level of trade with θ, which is costly for P 1 . Indeed, using (SR 2 ) and δ * 1 (1|θ) = 1 and combining (IC 1 ) with (IC 1 ), gives δ 1 (1|θ) ≤ 1 − (1 − H) ∆b |∆a| d(s 2 |θ) which is strictly less than one when P 1 discloses information, that is when d(s 2 |θ) > 0.
The marginal effect of increasing d(s 2 |θ) is then given by
where the first term is simply the benefit of increasing the probability of a downstream price discount for the high type (recall that d(s 2 |θ) = Hd(s 2 |θ)), the second term is the cost of reducing the level of trade with the high type, and the third term is the reduction in the rent for θ generated by countervailing incentives. 17 Rewriting (5), we thus have that disclosure is optimal for P 1 if and only m 1 + a − 1−p p |∆a| < H|∆a| p(1−H) . 17 As shown in the Appendix, at the optimum, U A (θ; φ *
Proposition 2 When x 1 and x 2 are horizontally differentiated, disclosure is motivated by the possibility of exploiting countervailing incentives to appropriate surplus from downstream contracting. Suppose preferences are as in Conditions (1) and (3). Disclosure is optimal if and only if P 2 's beliefs are unfavorable to the agent and the cost of reducing the level of trade with the high type is small.
Finally, consider the effect of disclosure on individual payoffs and welfare. P 2 is not affected by disclosure, since φ * 1 makes her indifferent between asking the prices she would have asked in the absence of disclosure and the equilibrium ones. As for the agent, when m 1 + a − 1−p p |∆a| < 0, A gets the same payoff as when P 1 is not allowed to disclose information, since the increase in his rent with P 2 is entirely appropriated by P 1 . But when m 1 + a − 1−p p |∆a| ≥ 0, disclosure reduces the rent of the low type from |∆a| to δ * 1 (1|θ) |∆a| − d * (s 2 |θ)∆b without increasing that of the high type, thus making A strictly worse off. Indeed, by increasing the surplus of the high type, disclosure reduces the low type's incentive to mimic and thus allows P 1 to reduce the rent she must cede for truthful revelation.
In terms of welfare, when m 1 + a − 
Disclosure of endogenous information
In this Section, we consider environments where the agent's valuation in the downstream relationship depends on upstream decisions, as in the case of a buyer whose willingness to pay for a downstream product or service depends on complementarity, or substitutability, with the products and services purchased from an upstream vendor.
The reason why disclosure can be optimal when preferences are non-separable is that it permits P 1 to sustain a more profitable level of trade upstream without eliminating the rent the agent obtains in the downstream relationship. To illustrate, assume the following.
Condition 4 The agent's preferences are not separable: v
The two products are complements if g > 0 and substitutes if g < 0. That the downstream surplus does not depend on θ guarantees that disclosure is entirely about endogenous information. We also assume that trade continues to generate positive surplus in both relationships, that is m 1 + a (θ) ≥ 0 for any θ, m 2 + b ≥ 0 and m 2 + b + g > 0. 18 
Complements
When preferences are as in Condition 4, the solution to P 2 (s) assigns the same allocation to θ θ) and is equivalent to a take-it-or-leave-it offer at a price t 2 (s) ∈ {b, b + g}. This implies that P 1 does not need to disclose more than two signals, s 1 , and s 2 , such that t 2 (s 1 ) = b + g and t 2 (s 2 ) = b. Conditional on receiving information s 2 , a low price is optimal for P 2 if and only if she assigns sufficiently low probability to A's having purchased the complementary product from P 1 , that is, if and only if Pr(x 1 = 1|s 2 )g ≤ (m 2 + b) Pr(x 1 = 0|s 2 ), or equivalently
. 19 The left-hand side is simply the cost of leaving the agent an informational rent when asking a low price t 2 = b, while the right-hand side is the cost of not trading when asking a high price t 2 = b + g. Since A has no private information about his valuation for x 2 , P 1 can appropriate the entire surplus δ 1 (1, s 2 )g that A expects from contracting with P 2 . This also implies that the rent P 1 must cede to A is independent of the disclosure policy, and is the same as in the absence of downstream contracting, i.e. U A (θ; φ 1 ) = δ 1 (1|θ)∆a and U A (θ; φ 1 ) = 0. The optimal contracts then maximize
is an upper bound for the rent P 2 leaves to the agent. To maximize this upper bound, it is always optimal to send signal s 2 if trade does not occur, which implies that (SR 1 ) never binds and δ 1 (0, s 2 ) = 1 − pδ 1 (1|θ) − (1 − p)δ 1 (1|θ). The cost of increasing the rent that P 2 leaves to the agent is thus the (virtual) surplus that P 1 forgoes by reducing the level of trade in the upstream relationship. It is then immediate that for m 2 + b ≤ m 1 + a − p 1−p ∆a, it is optimal to sell to either type, in which case there is no disclosure. However, when m 2 + b > m 1 + a − p 1−p ∆a, it is profitable for P 1 to sacrifice trade with the low type to induce P 2 to give the agent a price discount. The properties of the optimal mechanism then depend on the price that P 2 asks if P 1 sells only to θ. When the complementarity is small so that P 2 asks a low price, P 1 sells with certainty to the high type and with probability less than one to the low type and does not disclose any information.
When the complementarity is strong, so that P 2 is expected to ask a high price, P 1 has two options: sacrifice trade also with θ and guarantee that P 2 will lower her price, or continue to trade with certainty with the high type and use the disclosure policy to induce P 2 to offer a price discount with probability positive, but less than one. When m 1 +ā ≤ m 2 + b, P 1 finds it optimal to sacrifice trade. When instead m 1 +ā > m 2 + b, the optimal mechanism has the following structure:
Signal s 1 can thus be interpreted as the decision to inform P 2 that trade occurred in the upstream relationship, s 2 as the decision to keep all information secret. The optimal policy then consists in not disclosing any information if A decides not to purchase (which occurs if and only if θ = θ) and informing P 2 with probability δ * 1 (1, s 2 |θ) ∈ (0, 1) otherwise. 20 Proposition 3 Suppose preferences are as in Condition (4) and x 1 and x 2 are complements. Disclosure is motivated by the possibility of inducing P 2 to offer the agent a price discount without reducing the upstream level of trade. Disclosure is optimal when (i) the complementarity is sufficiently strong that excluding the low type is not sufficient to induce P 2 to ask a low price; (ii) the cost of reducing the level of trade with the high type is greater than the benefit of increasing the probability of a downstream price discount, whereas the opposite is true for the low type (i.e.
As for the effects of disclosure on individual payoffs and welfare, when m 1 + a − p 1−p ∆a > 0 and g < ∆a(m 2 + b)/ (m 1 + a − m 2 − b), P 1 would trade with either type with certainty if disclosure were not allowed. Clearly, in this case, disclosure benefits P 1 but harms A and P 2 : by reducing trade with the low type, P 1 decreases the rent for θ and the surplus that P 2 can extract from θ. Furthermore, since it is always efficient to trade in both relationships, disclosure is welfaredecreasing.
In all other cases, disclosure leads to a Pareto improvement, since it does not affect trade with the low type (hence the rent for θ) and it either increases trade with the high type or leaves it unchanged. P 2 clearly benefits from disclosure if it increases trade in the upstream relationship and is indifferent otherwise. Finally, since the optimal disclosure policy always induces P 2 to ask a low price when A does not purchase upstream, this guarantees that trade always occurs in the downstream relationship thus maximizing efficiency.
Corollary 3 Disclosure harms P 2 and A and is welfare-decreasing if it reduces the upstream level of trade. Else, it leads to a Pareto improvement.
Substitutes
Finally, consider a situation where the products of the two sellers are substitutes, in which case the agent obtains a positive surplus with P 2 only if he does not reduce his valuation by purchasing from P 1 . To be consistent with the notation used so far, we continue to denote by s 1 the information that induces P 1 to ask a high price, so that t(s 1 ) = b and t(s 2 ) = b + g < b. The optimal mechanism maximizes
Note that the upper bound for the rent that P 2 leaves to the agent is (m 2 + b + g)δ 1 (1, s 2 ) so that it is always optimal to send signal s 2 when A purchases from P 1 , which also implies that (SR 1 ) never binds and δ 1 (1, s 2 ) = pδ 1 (1|θ) + (1 − p)δ 1 (1|θ).
Since A now obtains a rent with P 2 only if he does buy upstream, the optimal contracts compare the surplus P 1 can appropriate by trading with either type with what she can get by not selling and making P 2 offer a lower price. Clearly, when |g| ≤ m 1 + a − p 1−p ∆a, the rent A gets with P 2 is so small that it never pays to sacrifice upstream trade. On the contrary, when |g| > m 1 + a − p 1−p ∆a, P 1 finds it optimal not to sell to the low type. The optimal mechanism then depends on the price P 2 is expected to ask when P 1 sells only to the high type. When substitutability is small, selling only to θ suffices to induce P 2 to ask a low price. In this case, the optimal mechanism is δ * 1 (1|θ) = 1 = δ * 1 (0|θ) = 1 if |g| ≤ m 1 +ā and δ * 1 (1|θ) ∈ (0, 1) and δ * 1 (0|θ) = 1 otherwise. Indeed when |g| > m 1 +ā, P 1 finds it more profitable to sacrifice trade with the high type as well, so as to let the latter enjoy a downstream rent with positive probability. Trade with the high type is then stochastic, but again the optimal mechanism does not require disclosure.
Next consider the less favorable case in which P 2 is expected to ask a high price when P 1 sells only to θ. P 1 then needs to sell with positive probability also to θ if she wants to reduce the downstream price. The value of selling to the low type must then be adjusted to take into account the increase in the probability of a downstream rent, as indicated in (SR 2 ). It follows that for m 1 + a − p 1−p ∆a + m 2 + b + g > 0, selling to θ with positive probability is optimal for P 1 , in which case trade is stochastic and involves no disclosure. When this value is negative, however, it is more profitable to exclude the low type and induce P 2 to leave a rent with probability less than one by adopting a disclosure policy with the following structure:
As with complements, signal s 1 can be interpreted as the decision to inform P 2 that trade did not occur upstream and s 2 as the decision not to disclose any information.
Finally, note that for high levels of substitutability (i.e. |g| ≥ m 2 + b) disclosure becomes irrelevant, since P 2 always asks a high price, whatever her beliefs about x 1 . (4) and x 1 and x 2 are substitutes. Disclosure is motivated by the possibility of inducing P 2 to offer a price discount without increasing the level of trade in the upstream relationship. Disclosure is optimal when (i) selling only to the high type is not sufficient to induce P 2 to ask a low price; (ii) the cost of selling to the low type more than offsets the benefit of increasing the probability of a downstream price discount (i.e.
Proposition 4 Suppose preferences are as in Condition
Consider the effects of disclosure on payoffs. When disclosure is not allowed, P 1 has two options. She may trade with both types with positive probability or else she may exclude the low type by asking a price t 1 = a that induces P 2 to ask a high price t 2 = b. In this latter case, disclosure is clearly welfare-enhancing, since it does not affect trade upstream and increases it downstream. What is more, disclosure yields a Pareto improvement: P 1 is clearly better off since disclosure is strictly optimal; A is indifferent since he gets no surplus with either principal anyway; and P 2 is also unaffected, since the optimal mechanism makes her just indifferent between asking a high price with certainty -as in the absence of disclosure -and reducing the price conditional on receiving information s 2 .
On the contrary, when the optimal mechanism in the absence of disclosure is such that P 1 sells also to θ with positive probability so as to induce P 2 to lower her price, A strictly suffers from disclosure since it reduces the rent for θ. On the other hand, P 2 benefits from the reduction in upstream trade, since this increases the agent's willingness to pay downstream. The net effect on welfare then depends on whether it is efficient for P 1 to sell to the low type, that is on whether m 1 + a ≷ |g| .
Corollary 4 When disclosure reduces the upstream level of trade, it damages A and benefits P 1 and P 2 ; its effect on welfare is positive if and only if it is inefficient to sell to the low type upstream. In all other cases, disclosure yields a Pareto improvement.
Concluding remarks
We have considered the dynamic interaction between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent. The focus is disclosure policies that control optimally for the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We have shown that the optimal policy is keeping all information secret when: (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the level of trade downstream; (b) the agent's valuations are positively correlated so that the sign of the single crossing condition is the same for upstream and downstream decisions; and (c) preferences in the downstream relationship are additively separable, so that downstream decisions do not depend on the upstream level of trade.
When any of these conditions is violated, however, there exist preferences for which disclosure is strictly optimal, regardless of the price the downstream principal is willing to pay for information.
Finally, we have shown that the possibility of disclosing information does not necessarily harm the agent and in some cases even leads to Pareto improvements.
To bring out the various effects at work, we have examined the determinants of the disclosure of exogenous and endogenous information separately. Further, the results have been derived under the assumption that the upstream principal can commit perfectly to any privacy policy she chooses. The design of optimal policies in environments where disclosure may be driven by a combination of the different determinants discussed above is an interesting line for future research. Similarly, relaxing the assumption of full commitment may deliver new insights into the welfare effects of disclosure and the desirability of regulatory intervention in the area of privacy. We expect the main strategic effects that we have highlighted to prove useful also in the study of these more complex environments.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Under conditions (a) and (c), the preferences for P 1 , P 2 and A can be written as
with v 1 (0, θ) = v j i (0, θ) = 0 for any θ ∈ Θ, j = 1, 2, and i = 2, A. To save on notation, we let
The proof is by contradiction and is in four steps.
Step 1 constructs the optimal mechanisms {φ 2 (s)} s∈S .
Step 2 identifies necessary conditions for φ 1 and {φ 2 (s)} s∈S to solve P 1 .
Step 3 introduces an alternative mechanism φ -that does not disclose information and induces the same upstream decisions as φ 1 .
Step 4 proves that if φ 1 and {φ 2 (s)} s∈S solve P 1 , so do (φ
, contradicting the assumption that disclosure is strictly optimal.
Step 1. Since preferences in the downstream relationship are separable, the mechanisms {φ 2 (s)} s∈S are independent of x 1 so that
x 1 ) such that θ = e θ. Indeed, for any mechanism φ 2 (s) that depends on x 1 , there exists another mechanism φ 0 2 (s) that is independent of x 1 and is payoff-equivalent for all players. This also implies that when P 2 does not receive information, her optimal mechanism does not depend of φ 1 and will be denoted by φ
. Finally, when W 2 (1, θ) ≤ 0 for one of the two types, information disclosure is irrelevant since φ 2 does not depend on P 2 's posterior beliefs. In what follows, we thus assume W 2 (1, θ) > 0 for all θ. The mechanisms φ 2 and φ ND 2 then satisfy
x ND 2 (θ) = arg max
Step 2.
, for any individually rational and incentivecompatible mechanism φ 1 -with reaction {φ 2 (s)} s∈S -
If φ 1 and {φ 2 (s)} s∈S solve P 1 , then necessarily
and
Step 3. Consider now an alternative mechanism φ ND 1 that does not disclose information, that induces the same distribution over X 1 as φ 1 and is such that
The mechanism φ
-is also individually rational and incentive-compatible and yields
It follows that
Using (6), (8) and (9), (10) reduces to
Step 4. First, consider the last two terms in (11) . From (7), the difference between these two terms is never positive. Next, consider the first term in (11) . . >From standard representation theorems (Milgrom, (1981) -Proposition 1), it then follows that P 21 We conclude that if φ 1 and {φ 2 (s)} s∈S solve P 1 , so do (φ Assume θ is distributed over Θ ≡ [θ, θ] with absolutely continuous log-concave c.d.f. F and density f strictly positive over Θ. Furthermore, let X 1 = X 2 = R + and suppose v i A (x i , θ), v 1 (x 1 , θ) and v 2 2 (x 2 , θ) are thrice continuously differentiable and satisfy
These conditions are standard in mechanism design with a continuum of types (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Chapter 7) and imply that the optimal mechanism for a single principal controlling both x 1 and x 2 is deterministic and is characterized by two schedules x 1 (θ) and x 2 (θ) with no bunching. It suffices to prove the result for γ = 1; if disclosure is not optimal when γ = 1, it is clearly not optimal for any γ < 1. Letting Ψ(s|θ) and Γ(x 1 |θ) denote the c.d.f. of the lotteries over S ⊆ R and X 1 , we have that
where
Now suppose P 1 could control x 2 (θ) and t 2 (θ) directly. That is, consider a fictitious mechanism e φ 1 = ( e Γ(x 1 |θ), e Ψ(s|θ), e x 2 (θ; s), U A (θ; e φ 1 )) in which A must report θ only at t = 1 and where the lotteries over X 2 are obtained by combining e Ψ(s|θ) with e x 2 (θ; s). The mechanism e φ 1 which maximizes (12) subject to standard individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints is deterministic and is characterized by schedules e x 1 (θ) and e x 2 (θ) which maximize pointwise
together with a rent for the agent equal to
Since in the absence of disclosure P 2 offers a mechanism such that
(z),z) ∂z dz, it follows that P 1 can guarantee herself U 1 ( e φ 1 ) by offering a deterministic mechanism such that x 1 (θ) = e x 1 (θ) and
and committing not to disclose any information.
Proof of Proposition 1.
We prove that there exists a threshold E(H) such that when H < 1 (respectively, H ≥ 1) disclosure is optimal if and only if e > E(H) > 0 (respectively, e ≤ E(H) < 0).
Consider the program for the optimal mechanism as in the main text. First, note that (SR 1 ) and (SR 2 ) cannot be both slack. If this were the case, P 1 could reduce d(s 1 |θ) and increase d(s 2 |θ), increasing her payoff and relaxing (IC 1 ). Second, using d(
Since at least one of these constraints must bind, it follows that for H < 1, (SR 2 ) is binding and (SR 1 ) is slack, whereas the opposite is true for H ≥ 1.
Also note that by increasing δ 1 (1|θ), P 1 increases the objective function and relaxes (IC 1 ). Hence, at the optimum, trade occurs with certainty with θ.
Case 1: Unfavorable beliefs (H < 1). Substituting δ * 1 (1|θ) = 1 and d(s 2 |θ) = Hd(s 2 |θ), the program for φ * 1 reduces to
When m 1 + a − p 1−p ∆a < 0, it is always optimal not to trade with the low type, i.e. δ * 
We conclude that with unfavorable beliefs, disclosure is optimal if and only if
Case 2: Favorable beliefs (H ≥ 1). Substituting d(s 1 |θ) = Hd(s 1 |θ) and d(s 2 |θ) = 1 − d(s 1 |θ), the program for the optimal mechanism becomes
The proof follows the same steps as with unfavorable beliefs. 
where E = E(H) is as in (13) We conclude that with favorable beliefs disclosure is optimal if and only if e < E(H) < 0.
Proof of Corollary 1. To see that P 2 is not affected by disclosure, note that under the optimal contracts derived in the proof of Proposition 1, (SR 2 ) binds and (SR 1 ) is slack when H < 1, whereas the opposite is true when H ≥ 1. This means that for s = s 1 (respectively, s = s 2 when H ≥ 1), P 2 strictly prefers to ask the same price she would have asked in the absence of disclosure, whereas for s = s 2 (respectively, s = s 1 ) she is indifferent between asking t 2 = b and t 2 = b. Together with the fact that U 2 is independent of x 1 , this implies that P 2 is just as well off as in the absence of disclosure.
Next, consider the effect of disclosure on A and assume favorable beliefs (the case H < 1 is discussed in the main text). Without disclosure, U A (θ; φ . While the negative effect of disclosure on U A does not depend on e, the positive effect on U 1 increases without bound with |e|. It follows that for moderate values of |e|, disclosure is welfare-decreasing, whereas the opposite is true for large negative externalities.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Consider the program for the optimal mechanism as in the main text. First, note that it is always optimal to sell to the low type, i.e. δ * 1 (1|θ) = 1. Second, note that when H ≥ 1, (SR 1 ) binds and (SR 2 ) is slack, whereas the opposite is true when H < 1 (the argument is identical to that in the proof of Proposition 1).
Then reducing d(s 1 |θ) to zero and increasing U A (θ; φ 1 ) by ∆bd(s 1 |θ) increases U 1 without violating any of the constraints. Hence, necessarily d * (s 2 |θ) = d * (s 2 |θ) = 1, which implies that full privacy is always optimal with favorable beliefs. When ∆b ≥ |∆a| , the optimal contracts are such that U A (θ; φ * . First, observe that at the optimum (IC 1 ) must be saturated. If this were not true, then necessarily U A (θ; φ 1 ) = 0 and δ 1 (1|θ) = 1, since otherwise P 1 could reduce U A (θ; φ 1 ) and/or increase δ 1 (1|θ) enhancing her payoff. But then from (IC 1 ) and
Next, we establish that U A (θ; φ * 1 ) = 0. Again, suppose this is not true. Then necessarily U A (θ; φ 1 ) = 0, since otherwise P 1 could reduce both rents by the same amount. Using the result that (IC 1 ) necessarily binds, we have that U A (θ;
where the upper bound comes from (IR 1 ) and (IC 1 ) substituting U A (θ; φ 1 ) and U A (θ; φ 1 ) and using (SR 2 ). If ∆b ≤ |∆a| , min 
Note that (IR 1 ) and (IC 1 ) can be jointly satisfied if and only if d(
which is increasing in d(s 2 |θ) and maximized by setting d * (s 2 |θ) = min
The optimal mechanism involves information disclosure and is such that d * (s 2 |θ) = min
binds, in which case P 1 's payoff reduces to
The optimal mechanism then discloses information and is such that d * (s 2 |θ) = min
We conclude that with unfavorable beliefs, disclosure is optimal if and only if m 1 +a−
Proof of Corollary 2. That P 2 is not affected by disclosure follows from the same arguments as in the proof of Corollary 1.
Consider the effect of disclosure on U A . As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, U A (θ; φ * 1 ) = 0 and U A (θ; φ * 1 ) = δ * 1 (1|θ) |∆a| − d * (s 2 |θ)∆b. In contrast, without disclosure, U A (θ; φ At the optimum, (SR 1 ) never binds and δ * 1 (0, s 1 |θ) = 0 for any θ. Indeed, reducing δ 1 (0, s 1 |θ) and increasing δ 1 (0, s 2 |θ) relaxes (SR 1 ) and (SR 2 ) without affecting (IC 1 ) and U 1 . Constraint (IC 1 ) can also be ignored, since it is always satisfied at the optimum.
Next, note that the maximal surplus that P 1 can appropriate from P 2 by reducing the level of trade upstream and disclosing signal s 2 instead of s 1 is bounded from above by the right hand side in (SR 2 ). On the other hand, the cost of creating a downstream rent is the surplus that P 1 forgoes when she does not trade, i.e. and hence the optimal mechanism is simply δ * 1 (1, s 1 |θ) = 1 for any θ and does not require disclosure. On the contrary, when m 1 + a − p 1−p ∆a < m 2 + b, at the optimum, δ * 1 (1, s 1 |θ) = 0. If this were not true, P 1 could transfer an ε probability from δ 1 (1, s 1 |θ) to δ 1 (0, s 2 |θ) and then increase * We conclude that disclosure is optimal if and only if (i) g > [(1 − p) (m 2 + b)]/p, i.e. when the complementarity is sufficiently strong that excluding the low type is not sufficient to induce P 2 to ask a low price and (ii) m 1 + a − p 1−p ∆a < m 2 + b < m 1 +ā, that is, when the cost of reducing trade with the high type is higher than the benefit of increasing the downstream rent, whereas the opposite is true with the low type.
Proof of Corollary 3.
Step 1 derives the optimal mechanism φ ND 1 when P 1 is not allowed to disclose information and (i) g > [(1 − p) (m 2 + b)]/p and (ii) m 1 + a − p 1−p ∆a < m 2 + b < m 1 +ā, in which case disclosure would have been optimal for P 1 .
Step 2 compares payoffs in this mechanism with those in the optimal mechanism derived in the proof of Proposition 3.
Step 1. Among all mechanisms that induce P 2 to set a high price t 2 = b + g, the one that maximizes U 1 is δ 1 (1|θ) = δ 1 (1|θ) = 1 if m 1 + a − 
Following the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3), under (i) and (ii), the solution to P ND 1 is δ 1 (1|θ) = In this case, disclosure also harms P 2 since it decreases the value θ attaches to downstream contracting. Furthermore, since it is efficient to trade in both relationships, disclosure is welfare-decreasing. In all other cases, disclosure yields a Pareto improvement, since it does not affect trade with θ and it either increases trade with θ, or else it leaves it unchanged.
Proof of Proposition 4.
The optimal contracts maximize At the optimum, δ * 1 (1, s 1 |θ) = 0 for any θ. Indeed, by reducing δ * 1 (1, s 1 |θ) and increasing δ * 1 (1, s 2 |θ), P 1 relaxes (SR 1 ) and (SR 2 ) with no effect on (IC 1 ) and U 1 . It follows that constraint (SR 1 ) can be neglected. Constraint (IC 1 ) will also be ignored since it never binds. Also note that δ * 1 (0, s 1 |θ) = 0, since otherwise P 1 could reduce δ * 1 (0, s 1 |θ) and increase δ * 1 (1, s 2 |θ) relaxing (SR 2 ) and increasing U 1 .
If |g| ≤ m 1 + a − p 1−p ∆a, the optimal mechanism is simply δ * 1 (1, s 2 |θ) = δ * 1 (1, s 2 |θ) = 1. If, instead, m 1 + a − p 1−p ∆a < |g| < m 1 +ā, the unconstrained solution is δ * 1 (1, s 2 |θ) = δ * 1 (0, s 2 |θ) = 1 and satisfies (SR 2 ) if and only if |g| ≤ p(m 2 +b). If, however, p(m 2 +b) < |g| ≤ m 2 +b,
